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Philosophe/philosopher

Let us make a detour via Italy and borrow a phrase from the Neapolitan jurist Gaetano Filangieri who, in the 1780s, wrote in his *Science of Legislation*, 'The *philosophe* must be an apostle of truth and not an inventor of systems.'[1] The distinction between *philosophe* and philosopher has often been linked to two different spheres of activity: on the one hand, the publicist and man of letters; on the other, the scientist, scholar and natural philosopher. The intense dialogue between the history of philosophy, history of science and cultural history now allows us to go further. The social and cultural density of philosophy in the Enlightenment is becoming apparent outside spaces where its production and reception seem the most legitimate. But Enlightenment philosophy is not confined to writings and concepts, for it can be seen at once as knowledge, social practice and a cultural object far exceeding the context of teaching in schools and universities. Can this maximal extension of the philosophical domain be explained without invoking the usual explanation of the epistemological boundaries of different fields of philosophical knowledge in the classical age? It seems imperative to shift the focus by totally abandoning a definition of philosophy in terms of disciplines in order to approach the question obliquely. Hence, this chapter will concentrate on the differentiation, the partitioning or, conversely, the blurring of distinctions.[2] Instead of taking fixed definitions as its starting point, this chapter will map the work of their production by exploring their various underlying tensions and considering boundary objects.

Philosophy and/or science?

The first tension we must examine arises between fields of knowledge and philosophy in the Enlightenment. How should we understand eighteenth-century philosophy? Philosophical knowledge in its different aspects should be understood not as a block of disciplines but rather as a system in which statements and intellectual practices circulate between different

forms of knowledge. The philosophy taught in colleges and universities was well defined within the framework of the liberal arts and quadrivium. It was integrated knowledge. It included lessons in logic, physics and metaphysics, sometimes supplemented by mathematics and geography.[3] Natural philosophy gained increasing autonomy as the different intellectual domains began to draw apart. In the second half of the eighteenth century, natural history, chemistry, botany, zoology, geology and physics gradually lost their strictly philosophical definition to become scientific disciplines in their own right. However, the shift from 'natural philosophy' to modern sciences was not linear. Many fields of knowledge were simultaneously seeking to be labelled as philosophy, a term synonymous with breadth. The linguist Ferdinand Brunot tried to measure the expansion that the concept of philosophy underwent in the eighteenth century in his *Histoire de la langue française* (*History of the French Language*).[4] Its flexibility can be seen in many expressions describing the state of knowledge at the time, including 'philosophical chemistry', 'zoological philosophy', 'economic philosophy', 'rural philosophy', 'philosophical grammar' and new terms such as 'experimental philosophy', 'moral philosophy' and 'speculative philosophy'. These designations did not correspond to the traditional representation of philosophy as an academic discipline. Instead, they indicated an identity, a new general economy of knowledge. In 'the detailed explanation of the system of human knowledge' offered by the *Encyclopédie*, Diderot is careful to make 'philosophy and science' equivalent: 'Philosophy, or that portion of human knowledge that must be linked to reason, is very broad. There is almost no object grasped by the senses from which reflective thought has not formed a science.'[5] Michel Foucault has noted the decisive mutation in the classical age concerning the field of philosophy and its objects:

> Philosophy was, precisely, the organisational system, the system that allowed knowledges to communicate with one another … With the disciplinarisation of knowledges, in its polymorphous singularity, now leads to the emergence of a phenomenon and a constraint that is now an integral part of our society. We call it 'science'. At the same time, and for the same reason, philosophy loses its foundational and founding role.[6]

In this science, we can sense the Foucaldian episteme, understood 'as a set of relations between sciences, epistemological figures, positivities and discursive practices'.[7] The 'restricted' philosophy – as in 'restricted' rhetoric – that emerged in the nineteenth century had to work through the loss of this global knowledge, while, beyond the break imposed by modern philosophy, an older definition of philosophy as wisdom persisted.

The *philosophe*: professor or sage?

Extending this initial opposition, we must also re-evaluate the social and 'professional' status of the *philosophe*, reconsidering the identity of the teacher and the teaching of philosophy as well. While the erudite philosopher is automatically classed as a teacher, the *philosophe* is placed among the men of letters and amateurs. As heir to the 'new' philosophy of the seventeenth century, the Enlightenment was grounded in a relationship of inclusion in and opposition to the philosophy of colleges and university arts faculties.

Dictionaries first recorded this change of status and blurring of identities. In his analysis of the different meanings of the word *philosophe* in the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie française* of 1694, 1718 and 1740, Daniel Brewer notes a shift from identification with the professor of logic to the polemical definition that would become current in the mid eighteenth century: 'He is a man who rejects nothing, who constrains himself in relation to nothing, and who leads the life of a *philosophe*.'[8] With Dumarsais, the *philosophe* gained his recognition from a subversive reputation. Subsequently, in the context of the theatre, a series of plays developed new social representations of the *philosophe* and opened up a literary space of satire and critique, from Saint-Jorry's *Le Philosophe trompé par la nature* (*The Philosopher Deceived by Nature*) (1719) to the marquis de Sade's *Le Philosophe soi-disant* (*The So-called Philosopher*) (1769).[9] The *philosophe* appears as an Enlightenment invention whose social portrait requires redrawing. Most of these plays were based on Marmontel's story *Le Philosophe soi-disant* (1759), from which a total of eight plays were adapted. They reflect the reworking and transposition of narrative into drama and vice versa that was common in the eighteenth century. To judge from the many theatrical adaptations produced in the years 1760–3, the story enjoyed considerable success. The theme of the self-proclaimed *philosophe*, the false *philosophe* hoodwinked and unmasked, was highly contemporary. Fréron's attacks in his journal *L'Année littéraire* (*The Literary Year*) and those of Palissot on stage were linked to an early pamphlet campaign against the *encyclopédistes*, whose cause was taken up by Marmontel. A second battle was unleashed on 2 May 1760 at the Théâtre-Français, with a three-act comedy in verse by Palissot. Another playwright, François-Georges Fouques, known as Desfontaines, adapted this play as *Le Philosophe prétendu* (*The Supposed Philosopher*), performed at the Théâtre-Italien on 6 October 1762. The various plays were primarily polemical in intent and gave visibility to new playwrights. Several elements characterize the representation of the *philosophe* in these pieces. First, he is a learned man steeped in Latin and Greek, directly

based on the character of the pedantic scholar Trissotin in Molière's *Les Femmes savantes* (*The Learned Ladies*). Palissot de Montenoy's comedy represents the *philosophe* with the features of Monsieur Carondas, 'bristling with Greek and scholastic terms' (line 94). Second, the playwrights highlight his solitude and lack of socialization, pursuing a theme dear to eulogists and found in representations of the savant as unmarried and living alone.[10] It is the *philosophe*'s asocial nature that helps drive the dramatic action. A play by Destouches opens on 'a book-lined study: Ariste is seated opposite a table, on which are a writing case and pens, books, mathematical instruments and a sphere.'[11] Biographies and academic eulogies of the *philosophe* formed another genre where the man of letters or genius aspiring to immortality was to be restored to primacy, alongside the philosophy professor.[12] The ethical dimension reflects the persistence of a cynical or more broadly ancient model associating intellectual life with spiritual exercise.[13] It also permitted the links between philosophical and religious beliefs to be maintained, denials and denunciations notwithstanding. Enlightenment prophetism, the view of the *philosophe* as an apostle, clearly expresses this convergence of the messianism of progress and Enlightenment spirituality.

Individuals or communities?

These new philosophies give rise to a problem of definition and of social and collective representations. How can a form of philosophy be collectively recognized unless it is incorporated within institutions? This question is crucial to understanding how philosophies were recognized by the corporatist society of the Ancien Régime. Furthermore, we question the pertinence of a notion of identity involving arrangements and properties attached to persons. This questioning would undoubtedly involve excising part of what posterity has designated by the term *philosophes*, retaining only philosophy teachers. Three types of actors played a key role in this negative representation.

First, censorship helped to qualify the group of philosophes negatively as a sect. The affairs of libertinage offer a prime site for investigating these processes of qualifying philosophy, since they reveal a propensity among the authorities to see groups everywhere. This sectarian interpretation was often propagated by men of the Church. When Loménie de Brienne condemned the materialists in his indictment of 18 August 1770, he had no compunction about using the argument that they formed a clandestine sect:

> There has arisen among us a bold and impious sect; it has adorned its false wisdom with the name Philosophy; beneath this imposing title it claims to possess all forms of knowledge. Its supporters have set themselves up as tutors

> to the human race. Freedom of thought is their cry, and this cry has echoed from one end of the world to the other. With one hand, they have sought to undermine the Throne; with the other they have tried to overturn the Altars. Their aim was to extinguish belief, to impress on minds a different teaching concerning religious and civil institutions; and, as it were, the revolution has taken place. The proselytes have proliferated, their maxims have spread: kingdoms have felt their ancient foundations tremble; and nations, astounded to find their principles obliterated, have asked what fate has caused them to become so different from themselves.[14]

Second, the police, especially in Paris, was instrumental in surveilling and identifying the philosophical threat. In the second half of the eighteenth century, libertinage was thus identified with the disturbance of public order, becoming sexualized in the language and practice of control. The geography of libertinage in Paris was not so much a geography of knowledge as a topology of pleasures. It 'contaminated' the Club du Palais-Royal reserved for the friends of the duc d'Orléans, and the Club des Arcades in the rue des Bons-Enfants, established in 1784. In August 1787, the baron de Breteuil sought to have the clubs banned, but in vain. Libertine *savoir-vivre* extended into places and settings that included the domestic spaces of high society.[15] It blossomed in boudoirs and houses of discretion which, through the fiction of plays and novels, became key places of libertine imagination. Finally, the enemies of the *philosophes*, the anti-*philosophes*, used polemics to open a discussion about the legitimacy of such intellectuals.

Knowledge, writing or practice?

Dictionary definitions also reveal a contrast between intellectual work, literary activity and behaviour in society. The *philosophe* was not merely a scholar; his art of philosophizing was rooted in the art of writing. Philosophy was completely altered as a result, since there was a shift from 'literary technology', designed to enable the communication of thought and intellectual content, to a heuristics in which writing was a way of practising knowledge and conducting an investigation. This shift permitted a deliberate blurring of the distinction between typical philosophical writing (essay or letters) and a wide range of genres and registers.

First, in the modern period, the concurrence of Latin with the various vernaculars turned the choice of language into an issue of philosophical communication. We know the degree to which Descartes's choices were decided by strategies of specific address and the possibility of expanding the audience for philosophy. The decline of Latin and the challenge to scholastic culture in the 1750s facilitated the emergence of vernacular philosophy. Unlike

philosophers, *philosophes* wrote first in French. Beyond issues of rhetoric and language, the diversity of genres used (meditation, speech, dispute, summary, letter, ballet, comedy, etc.) rendered the literary status of philosophy problematic; it could no longer be regarded as reflecting a discipline in the manner of a taught lesson or the normative discourse implied by a treatise. Examining the rhetorical techniques used by Pierre Bayle, for example, Gianluca Mori has revealed the persistence of a libertine tradition 'of writing between the lines'. Countering the ideal of transparency upheld by philosophers, which found its most complete expression in articles and reports of experiments in learned journals, the *philosophe* continued to expand the range of literary possibilities.[16]

As a consequence of this expansion, the 'epistemic genres' dear to natural philosophy became contaminated or were reformulated. Renaissance *historia* now had to come to terms with modern history. The case studies used in medical discourse gave way to a transformative vision of nature.[17] The format of Bacon's essays was reworked by Voltaire in his *Essai sur les mœurs* (*Essay on Manners*) of 1756. Description was reformulated in eighteenth-century natural history, in the work of Buffon and Diderot, to take account of the power of images.[18] Lastly, the place given to personal speech and anecdote, and the use of fiction, turn modern philosophy into a unique literary experiment, blurring any simple distinction between literature, science and philosophy. In this way, Enlightenment philosophy tested the scholarly literary norms of institutions of knowledge, while at the same time finding certain genres such as the dictionary, encyclopedia, dialogue and essay to be more suited to intellectual flexibility, the desire for a new summation of knowledge and a culture of judgement.

Critique, judgement and public space

The *philosophe* as opposed to the philosopher not only relocated philosophical work by taking it out of the schools and knowledge institutions but refocused it on the public space. Investigations tended to become spatialized, located perfectly within the well-established tradition of Enlightenment geography.[19] Philosophy was subject to the judgements of a newly emerging audience, and philosophers of nature began to recognize this audience's presence by organizing science displays. As a result, the question of judgement, which has often been portrayed as a critical paradigm based on Kantian philosophy, became a fundamental preoccupation of the Enlightenment beginning with Pierre Bayle and his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (*Critical and Historical Dictionary*) (1697). As Jacob Soll pointed out, 'The idea was that if established historical facts could be undermined

with other established facts, the reader would have to exercise great abilities to ascertain the truth.'[20] A 'social history of truth' has sought to analyse practices of scientific judgement, basing their definition on social interaction, discussion, reception and the accuracy of what was said.[21] In the eighteenth century much philosophical activity was devoted to circumscribing and explaining the uses of reason and identifying sources of human knowledge across time and space. The theoretical approaches developed throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries constantly sought to establish how to produce correct, valid reasoning. How can scientific statements be rendered universal without recourse to the art of generalities found in Aristotelian logic? One way was by redefining certainty by matching it to the vocabulary of law and of facts, or to a definition of the knowing subject, based on 'experience of oneself'. Another approach involved objectivizing objects of knowledge in order to eliminate individuality and perspectivism. By breaking down the relationship between knowledge produced and a particular place, language, culture or individual, Enlightenment scientists sought to make scientific statements more universal. This effort to clarify, mark out and situate judgement also involved defining disciplines, in which the paradigm of the sciences became a model for the identification of different types of judgement. The scientific arena saw the development of expertise directed at technical problems (urban water supplies, transportation and bridges, the risk of flooding and landslips, the relocation of cemeteries such as that of Les Saints-Innocents, the building of new hospitals such as the Hôtel-Dieu, etc.), which bound the philosophy of nature to the public sphere.

But judgement taken to the public square and intended for public opinion broke even more sharply with the logic of specialist judgement. While the *philosophes* played a specific role in the emergence of the socio-political form of the 'affair' in the eighteenth century, the iconic example being the Calas Affair, judgements proliferated at the local level in places such as salons. Intellectuals became particularly skilled at generating affairs. The long eighteenth century can thus appear as a succession of politico-religious scandals. The unfolding of the *Lettres philosophiques* scandal studied by J. B. Shank is part of a broader pre-encyclopedic context. Maupertuis had led the way in the scientific domain with his *Discours sur les différentes figures des astres* (*Discourse on the Different Figures of the Stars*) of 1732. Both Voltaire and Maupertuis were defenders of analytical mechanics. They made connections extending beyond their own interpretation of Newtonianism. By gaining recognition as the necessary mediator of Newtonian philosophy in France, Maupertuis built up his own reputation and authority within French scientific networks – the idea that France was 'Descartianized' by Voltaire is probably inaccurate. The position of Voltaire and Maupertuis was akin

to self-fashioning but was not completely new. It modified commonplaces, elements that were already well-rooted in the public and critical space. But it enabled the successful deployment of a new agent, a new 'persona', the *philosophe*. The shock caused by the *Lettres philosophiques* reflected not so much the novelty of the propositions advanced as the critical style of the text, which prefigured the invention of the affair, later created by Voltaire in the context of religious scandals. Moreover, contemporaries were shocked more by the tone and style of the treatise than by its content; the generalized use of a scornful tone is often mentioned. This concern with the practice of mobilization for a cause has led some historians to concentrate on the culture of scandal and indignation during the Ancien Régime. Before the eighteenth century, few had the 'courage of truth', to borrow Foucault's phrase. For fear of parrhesia, many erudite libertines preferred to retreat or to develop an art of writing between the lines. For many men of letters it was vital to invent a range of techniques that would enable them to exercise free speech without risking imprisonment or censure. In her book *The Cynic Enlightenment*, Louisa Shea rightly focuses on the importance of this cynic culture in the world of the Enlightenment. D'Alembert himself is called 'the Diogenes of our age'. The cynicism derived from antiquity was not very well regarded in the first half of the eighteenth century, as it contravened the norms of politeness, which themselves made plain speaking difficult. Louisa Shea shows how Diderot, who had rejected cynic strategies early in his career, reconsidered the advantages of a critical form of politeness following his incarceration in the Bastille in 1748. Through detailed analysis of the emergence of a culture of mockery and irony, other scholars have sought to reconstruct the stylistic grammar of polite critique.[22] In both the article on 'Eclecticism' in the *Encyclopédie* and in *Le Neveu de Rameau* (*Rameau's Nephew*), Diderot shows the good reasons for communication based on plain speaking.[23] The cynic tradition (in the wake of the libertine tradition) rejected alliances with the authorities and actively advocated cosmopolitanism. Rousseau portrayed himself as the defender of the motherland in his *Lettres écrites de la Montagne* (*Letters Written from the Mountain*), which were, however, cynic in intent. Far from being monolithic or holistic, the paradigm of critiques rests upon a horizontal proliferation of practices traversing Ancien Régime society, from popular rumours, art of slander and pornographic pamphlets to high Enlightenment and philosophical reflections.[24]

Interpreting and reading philosophy

In distinguishing the *philosophe* from the philosopher, we should consider the place of readers. The investigative approach of the history of reading

developed out of the dead ends of classical analyses of reception. Reception in philosophy brings us face to face with the already constituted oeuvres of the *philosophes*. In this category we could include Pierre Bayle's articles on numerous *philosophes*, such as the famous 'Spinoza' article, which is both the longest in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* and one of its most famous, since it inspired many commentaries in the eighteenth century from the likes of Voltaire, Diderot, Dom Deschamps and Condillac.[25] These 'philosophical' articles form only 5 per cent of the 2,044 articles in the *Dictionnaire*.[26] The hermeneutic space in which the evaluation of an author became established must be seen in the context of ongoing social developments. According to Pierre Saint-Amand, the reference points changed in the mid eighteenth century. Recognition had been an object of study for moralists and *philosophes* in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, before becoming an analytical category: 'the *philosophes* of the *Encyclopédie* marked out a path that would initiate a different policy of recognition. There was a move away from the world of dignity, place and rank, towards a different, more democratic world of dignity, personal esteem and individual recognition.'[27] The jurists of the *Encyclopédie*, such as d'Alembert in his *Essai sur la société des gens de lettres et des grands* (*Essay on the Society of Men of Letters and the Great*), developed an opposition between recognition based on the distinctions of the 'société des grands' and one based on esteem. The discussion between Condorcet and Turgot on the intellectual value of Helvétius's *De l'esprit* (*Essays on the Mind*) raises the question of how to determine the quality of a scandalous work in which the philosophical register is constantly blurred by moral and political arguments.

The circulation of philosophical writings could thus create what Brian Stock has called 'textual communities' extending beyond the group and mobilized across distance through the discussion, acceptance or rejection of a text.[28] Roger Chartier notes that the letter of a text itself is never fixed in advance but remains the changeable co-production of a chain of participants (authors, publishers, readers, interpreters, translators, etc.).[29] The letter of published texts also changes. J. B. Shank notes that Newtonianism emerged in France via two communities of interpreters: on the one hand, experimenters interested in the publication of Newton's 1704 treatise on *Opticks*, which was an obvious composite of documents and experiment protocols published in the 1690s; and, on the other, mathematicians and astronomers who were readers of the *Principia*. In turn, these two communities of readers influenced the republication and transformation of both works. These co-constructions of Newtonianism by its early interpreters helped shape historiography itself, which later distinguished the eighteenth century's true Newtonians (linked to Newton the theorist) from their false

counterparts linked to experimental method. More broadly, historians of the book have shown that philosophy books were well represented in urban libraries. In Paris throughout the 1750s, philosophy as a category was present in 140 libraries (14 per cent of the total). The list of books most frequently found in inventories places philosophical works in ninth place with Bayle's *Dictionnaire critique* and the abbé Pluche's *Spectacle de la nature*, confirming the high degree of interest in philosophy among the Parisian elites. But books read are not the same as books owned, and the proliferation of libraries in Paris, the practice of lending and the opening of reading cabinets in the years 1764–89, reflect the enthusiasm for encyclopedic works in the Parisian high society.[30]

The *philosophe*'s hand: archiving the Enlightenment

Following on from a genetic approach to philosophy, we can ask whether the use of papers forms a dividing line between *philosophe* and philosopher, distinguishing different archiving practices, often relying on institutions in the case of scientists. The idea of constituting an intellectual archive emerged gradually. In the Enlightenment century, publishers as intermediaries developed a practice of distinguishing and authenticating the hand of the *philosophe* that was close to attributionism or *connoisseurship* and enabled manuscripts to be identified.[31] This occurred in relation to a 'new' edition of Montesquieu's *L'Esprit des lois* (*The Spirit of the Laws*), which he was preparing just before his death. Two publishers, his son Jean-Baptiste de Secondat and the lawyer François Richer, claimed to have established the edition of 1757 'after the corrections that M. de Montesquieu himself gave to the publishers before his death'. However, a study of all the manuscripts and corrections indicates conversely that many corrections intended by the author were not included and that the posthumous works of 1783 were in fact based on the text of the 1748 edition. As Catherine Volpihac-Auger notes, 'The unfinished nature of these dossiers, the diversity of documents they contained and their heterogeneity itself have the remarkable advantage of revealing every stage of Montesquieu's work, captured in process, the progress of which we can thus reconstruct'.[32]

In the second half of the eighteenth century, collectors began seeking out philosophical manuscripts. This interest can clearly be seen arising out of the cult of great writers, in the cases of Voltaire and Newton for example, and with authors such as the marquis de Sade, for whom 'scribal publication' was crucial to the distribution of their work. Far from being oriented towards publication or print, these authors thought in terms of distributing their work in manuscript form. Beyond any practical imperatives, we also

see the emergence of a cult of autograph letters and manuscripts. The proliferation of collections of philosophical autographs in eighteenth-century Europe transformed intellectual networks into markets within which philosophical rarity could develop. At this point we need to examine bibliophilic practices closely in order to understand how philosophy books became collectible, how their use value morphed into heritage and how collections of philosophical works were built up.

The market in autographs and manuscript collections emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century with the sale of the papers of the major Enlightenment *philosophes*. A new awareness of the cultural value of these authors turned them into heritage and led to the development of *connoisseurship* and a collector's culture around philosophical manuscripts, which became increasingly disconnected from their intellectual use.

In 1780, Diderot is said to have planned to have his entire oeuvre copied in two collections, one for the publication of his complete works in Holland by the printer Marc-Michel Rey and the other for Catherine the Great. To enhance the value of the gift, Diderot sought the services of the calligrapher Roland Girbal, a former servant of Mme d'Epinay and Meister's preferred copyist for the *Correspondance littéraire*. A stable of some twenty secondary copyists was formed, including Girbal and Michel. We know that one of the manuscript collections was intended for Catherine to thank her for sending 2,000 roubles in June 1779, in order to help Diderot establish his children in society. When Diderot died in 1784, Friedrich Melchior Grimm contacted the Russian Empress. In 1785, Madame de Vandeul offered to send Catherine her father's manuscripts. Catherine's letter to Grimm states that she wanted to purchase both the manuscripts and Diderot's library. In November, thirty-two volumes were packed up and sent to Russia. The most famous acquisition is Catherine's purchase of Voltaire's library. On 21 June 1778, following Voltaire's death, the Empress quickly wrote to Grimm, his literary agent, who succeeded in acquiring the library from Voltaire's niece, Mme Denis, in September–December 1778. Voltaire's secretary, Jean-Louis Wagnière, packed the books and manuscripts and had them transported to Les Délices, near Geneva, where they remained until the spring of 1779, when they were sent to St Petersburg, to be placed in a special room in the Winter Palace.

The greatness of the *philosophe*: a deferred recognition?

Did the processes of manufacturing greatness distinguish the *philosophe* from the philosopher in the eyes of posterity? It seems likely, given the degree to which the Enlightenment century was imbued with a perception of

its own historicity. In the eighteenth century, funerals were an opportunity to stage events worthy of heads of state, but in the case of Enlightenment *philosophes* they sometimes caused a scandal. Voltaire's burial in Scellières in June 1778 was watched by a large crowd, and eyewitness accounts were published:

> M. l'abbé Mignot at once showed me a letter of consent from the priest of Saint-Sulpice, signed by him, allowing the body of M. de Voltaire to be transported without ceremony; he also showed me a copy, attached by the same priest of Saint-Sulpice, of a profession of the Catholic, apostolic and Roman faith, which M. de Voltaire made in the hands of an approved priest, in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom is M. Mignot, our abbé, nephew of the penitent, and the other a Marquis de Villevieille. He also showed me a letter from the minister of Paris, M. Amelot, addressed to him and M. Dampierre d'Ornoy, nephew of M. l'abbé Mignot and grand-nephew of the deceased, in which these gentlemen were authorized to transport their uncle to Ferney or elsewhere.[33]

In reality, the priest of Saint-Sulpice had refused to authorize Voltaire's burial in Paris. So, as in the case of Descartes' tomb, the commemoration of a *philosophe* in Paris immediately after his death remained problematic due to the inherent potential for scandal. These examples contrast with the cases of Newton and Rousseau, whose respective tombs in Westminster and Ermenonville became sites of pilgrimage at the end of eighteenth century. It was not until the French Revolution that *philosophes* were granted similar recognition in the form of national commemoration, with the return of Voltaire's remains to Paris and his pantheonization in 1791.[34]

NOTES

1 Gaetano Filangieri, *The Science of Legislation*, trans. William Kendall (1784) (London: G. G. and J. Robinson, 1791).
2 See Conal Condren, Stephen Gaukroger and Ian Hunter (eds.), *The Philosopher in Early Modern Europe: The Nature of a Contested Identity* (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
3 Laurence W. Brockliss, *French Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Cultural History* (Oxford University Press, 1987).
4 Ferdinand Brunot, *Histoire de la langue française* (1930) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966), chap. 2, 'Extension du concept de philosophie', p. 3.
5 Denis Diderot, 'Prospectus', in Diderot and d'Alembert (eds.), *Encyclopédie*.
6 Michel Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975–76*, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), p. 182.
7 Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A. M Sheridan Smith (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 192.
8 Daniel Brewer, 'Constructing Philosophers', in Daniel Brewer and Julie Candler Hayes (eds.), *Using the 'Encyclopédie': Ways of Knowing, Ways of Reading* (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2002), p. 26.

9 In forming a corpus I have used Joseph de La Porte, *Les Spectacles de Paris ou suite du calendrier historique et chronologique des théâtres* (Paris: Duchesne, 1751–1778); C. D. Brenner, *A Bibliographical List of Plays in the French Language, 1700–1789* (Berkeley, Calif., 1947).
10 Steven Shapin, '"The Mind is its Own Place": Science and Solitude in Seventeenth-Century England', *Science in Context*, 4 (1) (1991): 191–218; Roger Chartier, 'L'Homme de lettres', in *L'Homme des lumières*, ed. Michel Vovelle (Paris: Le Seuil, 1997), pp. 159–209.
11 Philippe Néricault Destouches, *Le Philosophe marié ou le mari honteux de l'être: comédie en vers, en cinq actes* (Vienna: Jean-Pierre van Ghelen, 1744).
12 C. B. Paul, *Science and Immortality: The Éloges of the Paris Academy of Sciences (1699–1791)* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980).
13 Pierre Hadot, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), pp. 17–18.
14 Cited by Paulette Charbonnel, 'Le Réquisitoire de Séguier', *Corpus, revue de philosophie*, 22–3 (1993), pp. 15–37, at p. 21. See also Jean-Claude Bourdin (ed.), *Les Matérialistes au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Payot, 1996).
15 Michel Delon, *Le Savoir-vivre libertin* (Paris: Hachette littératures, 2000); Antoine Lilti, *Le Monde des salons: sociabilité et mondanité à Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
16 Christian Licoppe, 'The Crystallization of a New Narrative Form in Experimental Reports (1660–1690): The Experimental Evidence as a Transaction between Philosophical Knowledge and Aristocratic Power', *Science in Context*, 7 (2) (1994): 205–44.
17 Giana Pomata and Nancy G. Sirinaisi (eds.), *Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005).
18 Joanna Stalnaker, *The Unfinished Enlightenment: Description in the Age of the Encyclopedia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), p. 7. John Bender and Michael Marrinan (eds.), *Regimes of Description: In the Archive of the Eighteenth Century* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).
19 Daniel Brewer, 'Lights in Space', *Eighteenth-Century Studies*, 37 (2) (2004): 171–86.
20 Jakob Soll, *Publishing the Prince: History, Reading, and the Birth of Political Criticism* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 2005), p. 3.
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